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Abstract. In this work, we present a novel algorithm based on an it-
erative sampling of random Gaussian blobs for black-box face recovery,
given only an output feature vector of deep face recognition systems. We
attack the state-of-the-art face recognition system (ArcFace) to test our
algorithm. Another network with different architecture (FaceNet) is used
as an independent critic showing that the target person can be identi-
fied with the reconstructed image even with no access to the attacked
model. Furthermore, our algorithm requires a significantly less number
of queries compared to the state-of-the-art solution.
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1 Introduction
The most common characteristic to identify a person from a still image is its face.
Automatic face identification is an important computer vision task with real-
world applications in smartphone cameras, video surveillance systems, human-
computer interaction. Following rapid progress in image classification [16,11],
object detection [25,26], semantic and instance segmentation [2,10], Deep Neural
Networks demonstrated state-of-the-art performance in face identity recognition,
even in extremely challenging scenarios with millions of identities [15].
Although end-to-end solutions exist, leading face recognition systems usually
require a few-step procedure. First, the face is detected in the given image, and
the alignment process is done. Then, the aligned face is fed to a face identification
network, which converts it to descriptive feature vectors of the lower dimension-
ality. It is challenging to allocate those representations so different images of the
same person are mapped to be closer to each other than to those of different.
Recent solutions incorporate different types of margins to the training loss
to enhance the discriminative power. Current state-of-the-art publicly available
model is ArcFace [4], a geometric method, that uses Additive Angular Margin
Loss, to produce highly distinguishable features and stabilize training process.
Besides strong performance of face recognition models in the real world, it is
crucial to study and overcome their vulnerabilities, since adversaries might harm
security and privacy aspects of such systems. Face recognition systems might
be maliciously attacked from different perspectives. Impersonation and dodging
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attacks aim to fool the network, by wearing specifically designed accessories such
as glasses [28]. 2D and 3D spoofing attacks have been demonstrated in practical
applications of face identification systems such as face unlock systems [17,24].
Another critical vulnerability of a face recognition system is the leakage of
data, as face embeddings (face identity features) might be reconstructed into
recognizable faces. In this paper, we consider black-box scenario (see Fig. 1),
i.e. we only receive embedding produced by face identification model for our
requesting image, without access to the model’s architecture, since unknown
embeddings might be exposed or hacked, and using corresponding target face
recognition APIs we can request necessary output.
Fig. 1: The schematic of the face recovery procedure from the identity features.
Main contributions of this work are the following:
– We proposed the novel face recovery method in the black-box setup;
– We quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrated the superiority of our
method compared to the previous one;
– The proposed method works without a prior knowledge such as a training
dataset from the same domain;
– We evaluated our method and its competitor with an independent critic;
– We proved that the result is the same for the train and test datasets.
Table 1: Comparison table
Algorithm Target model Setting Dataset-free
Ours Arcface output Black-Box +
NBNet[19] FaceNet output Black-Box -
Cole et. al. [3] FaceNet intermediate features White-box -
CNN[34] FaceNet output features White-box -
Gradient wrt input [18] Any classifier output White-box +
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2 Related Work
The remarkable progress of deep neural networks in many areas attained sig-
nificant attention in the scientific community to the nature of its internal rep-
resentations. Researchers always questioned how to interpret the decisions of
deep learning models. One way of interpretation of neural networks in the task
of pattern recognition was found to be the inverting of class outputs or hidden
feature vectors. Using image pixel gradients, optimization-based inversion of im-
age classification neural networks presented interesting results in [22,7,31,18,29].
The basic idea of this branch of works was to use white-box back-propagation to
get input gradients and minimize the loss between the network output and the
desired class to invert. Usually, due to the high dimensionality of the input and
high-frequency gradients, it is required to add heavy image priors, such as Total
Variation [18] or Gaussian Blur [31], which produces naturally looking images.
The model inversion attacks were proposed, which adopts gradient-based
inversion of the training classes to the task of face recognition [8], leaking some
representative images from training data, however it was shown that for deep
convolutional neural networks it is notoriously difficult [30,12]. This method also
used denoising and sharpening filters as the prior.
Another category of reconstruction of image representations is the training-
based inversion: an additional neural network is trained to map a feature vector
into an image. The resulting neural network is similar to a decoder part of an
auto-encoder network with the face identification encoder. To train a network,
usually, L1 or L2 loss is used between original and reconstructed images. The
results of this method were shown in [5,6,23]. Compared to gradient-based inver-
sion, training-based inversion is only costly during training the inversion model,
which is a one-time effort. Reconstruction from a given prediction requires just
one single forward pass through the network.
Training-based methods to recover faces from the facial embeddings were
found to produce interesting results in [34,3,19,21,20]. In [20], it was proposed to
use the radial basis function regression to reconstruct faces from its signatures.
In [21], multidimensional scaling was used to construct a similarity matrix be-
tween faces and embeddings. It should be mentioned, both [20] and [21] were
only tested for shallow neural networks. In [34], it was proposed to train a convo-
lutional neural network that maps face embeddings to the photographs, however
their method requires gradients of a face identification system. In [3], it was
proposed to yield a reconstructed image from estimated face landmarks and tex-
tures, however high-quality face images are required for estimation. In [19], it was
proposed to use the neighbourly de-convolutonal neural network to reconstruct
recognizable faces, however this method requires input-output pairs for train-
ing process, and thus might be overfitted towards dataset or face identification
model. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work on black-box zero-shot face
reconstruction from identity features was presented before. To fill this gap, we
propose our method. Since most of published results consider white-box setup,
as direct competitor for our solution we see NBNet [19]. Brief comparison of
various methods is collected in Table 1.
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2.1 Black-box mode, prior knowledge and number of queries
In this paper, we consider a black-box attack procedure: we do not have access
to the face recognition system and can only query it to get the output. In this
setup, the number of queries is the main performance metric, along with the
attack success rate. However, the number of queries is highly dependent on
prior knowledge about the model. For adversarial examples this phenomenon
is studied in [14]. Even models that are claimed to be fully black-box, such as
NBNet [19], in fact exploit deep prior about the target model. They need to
have a dataset from the same domain and the same alignment as it was for the
target model, otherwise they cannot learn the function between a face image
and an embedding since for the face-id network, this function is guaranteed to
work well only for properly aligned images. In practice, we can have the model
with a proprietary aligner and an unknown training dataset domain. One of the
advantages of our method is that it is fully black-box and can work even in such
a restrictive setup.
3 Gaussian sampling algorithm
We designed an iterative algorithm for reconstructing a face from its embedding.
The algorithm is a zero-order optimization in the linear space of 2D Gaussian
functions. One step of our algorithm is the following: we sample a batch of
random Gaussian blobs and add them to the current state image. Then the
batch is put into black-box feature extractor, and loss function is evaluated
across embeddings. Based on the evaluation, one image is selected and set as the
current image. Such a procedure is similar to the random descent in the linear
space of 2D Gaussian functions.
3.1 Choosing function-family for sampling
Fig. 2: Gaussian blob with parameters: x0, y0, σ1, σ2, A = 56, 72, 22, 42, 1.
In our algorithm we sample Gaussian functions (Fig. 2):
G(x, y) = A · exp (x− x0)
2
2σ21
exp
(y − y0)2
2σ22
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where,
x, y - pixel coordinates in the image,
x0, y0 - coordinates of a center of gaussian,
σ1, σ2 - vertical and horizontal standard deviations,
A - amplitude
Hypothetically, any function representing a basis in a 2D space can be chosen
as a function for the sampling. We tried sines/cosines, polynomial functions,
random noise, but only Gaussians-based approach works well. We suppose that
the reasons are the following:
1. Gaussian functions are semi-local, which means that the distortion of a pic-
ture is localized and hence more controllable. With even a small number of
such functions, it is easier to fit many shapes.
2. Low frequencies are dominant in Gaussian functions (if we restrict the in-
terval of possible σ). We suppose this prevents overfitting of an attacked
network and prevents generating of non-semantic high-frequency adversarial
patterns.
We found that the restriction of the vertical symmetry on the family of
sampling functions improves the speed of convergence and the quality of the
final result, which makes sense as human faces are mostly symmetrical, and
bringing this constraint to our algorithm reduces search space. We symmetrize
sampled Gaussians by adding a vertically flipped copy:
Gsym = G+ flip(G)
To relax the problem further on, i.e. simplify the optimization process, we
restore images in the grayscale colormap. In other words, the hypothesis is
that embedding of deep face recognition systems is tolerant to color. To ver-
ify the assumption, we set up two experiments for the most popular publicly
available face recognition systems: ArcFace [4] (model name ”LResNet100E-IR,
ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2”4, accessed March 21, 2020) and FaceNet [27] (model
name ”20180402-114759”5, accessed March 21, 2020). We checked pairwise sim-
ilarity of RGB image and its grayscale copy. We perform this experiment with
images from LFW [13] and MS-Celeb-1M [9] (version named ”MS1M-ArcFace”6,
accessed March 21, 2020) datasets. It can be clearly seen on Fig 4 that for the
majority of images moving to the grayscale domain did not affect much corre-
sponding embeddings. Anyway, we tried to reconstruct faces in the RGB domain,
but obtained colors turned out to be far from natural regardless of the shapes
being correct (Fig 3).
So, our finding is that face embeddings are mostly not sensitive to color;
therefore it is not possible to recover properly the color information of initial
picture. Most importantly, it relaxes the problem significantly, allowing us to
4 https://github.com/deepinsight/insightface/wiki/Model-Zoo
5 https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
6 https://github.com/deepinsight/insightface/wiki/Dataset-Zoo
6 A. Razzhigaev et al.
Fig. 3: From left to right: original image, reconstructed from embedding in
grayscale setting with symmetric constraint, without symmetric constraint, RGB
with symmetric constraint and corresponding cosine similarities by attacked
model (ArcFace) and independent (FaceNet).
sample only grayscale Gaussian blobs. But, despite the fact that we reconstruct
faces in a grayscale color space it is still possible to colorize it naturally later on
with the use of dedicated colorization models [33].
Fig. 4: Pairwise ArcFace cosine similarity of images and their grayscale analogs
from LFW and MS-celeb-1M datasets.
3.2 Loss function
A loss function is needed to choose the best sampled element from a batch. The
suggested loss function depends on norms of embeddings (the target one and
the embedding of a reconstructed image) and the cosine similarity between the
target embedding and the embedding of a reconstructed image:
L(y, y′) = λ · (‖y‖ − ‖y′‖)2 − s(y, y′),
Black-Box Face Recovery from Identity Features 7
where,
s - cosine similarity function,
‖y‖ - L2 norm of the target embedding,
‖y′‖ - L2 norm of the embedding of
a reconstructed image,
λ = 0.0025, empirically found hyperparameter
3.3 Initialization
We found that proper initialization of the algorithm has crucial importance.
Without an initialization, the algorithm most likely would not converge to a
face. We tried two variants of initialization (Fig 5):
1. Initialize with a face. This kind of initialization uses a predefined image
with a face. Such initialization works good and even let us not use norm of
an embedding (works just with cosine similarity between embeddings as a
loss function). But it has a strong disadvantage as the reconstructed face is
”fitted” into initialization face: reconstructed face looks similar to a target
person (facial traits), while it has the shape of initialization face. Thus, we
did not use this method for further experiments.
2. Initialize with the optimal Gaussian blob (optimal in terms of cosine similar-
ity between the target embedding and the Gaussian blob). We constructed
a set of 4480 vertically symmetric Gaussians, which are similar to the shape
of natural faces. Then we search for the best one for a given embedding
by comparing cosine similarities. This kind of initialization requires adding
the norm of an embedding to the loss function as, without it, it would not
converge to a face-like picture.
For both initializations, we fade-out the initialization part of the reconstructed
image at every iteration by multiplying it by fade-out coefficient 0.99.
3.4 Validation using independent critic
While comparing the results of different variations of the algorithm, we faced
a problem of the objective evaluation of the quality of a reconstructed face. In
[19] and [3] the cosine similarity between embeddings of the target image and
the reconstructed one was used as a criterion of quality, but they used the same
network for evaluation as for reconstruction attack, that, we think, might cause
some problems as the reconstructed face might have high similarity with the
true image but does not look like the same person and even does not look face-
like — so it is a kind of ”adversarial face” which has high similarity but looks
wrong. This happens as the network used for evaluation is the same as used in
an algorithm, and it is a ”dependent critic”. What is more important, because of
the specificity of our algorithm (minimizing loss), the reconstructed faces always
have cosine similarities higher than 0.9 when attacking the same network as
for similarities computation. To quantify the quality of a reconstructed image
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Fig. 5: From left to right: original image, two types initializations: an optimal
Gaussian blob and a random face, corresponding reconstructed images.
in a robust way, we suggest using another network with different architecture
compared to the attacked one as an ”independent critic”. Another solution is
to use the human evaluation (like Mean Opinion Score), but as human opinion
varies – some statistics are needed to quantify the quality of compared images.
We used FaceNet trained on VGGFace2 [1] as an independent critic. We
provide results for both metrics — ”dependent critic” and ”independent critic”.
3.5 Algorithm
The algorithm is a zero-order optimization in the space of 2D Gaussian func-
tions. At every step the best one Gaussian function from a batch is chosen in
terms of objective function and added to current reconstruction image. The for-
mal description of an algorithm is presented using Algorithm 1. An example
of the reconstruction process is presented in Fig. 6. The mean cosine similarity
dynamics while doing queries is presented on Fig. 7.
Fig. 6: Iterations of Gaussian sampling algorithm. From left to right: original
image, initialization, 30k queries, 60k queries, 300k queries.
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Algorithm 1 Face recovery algorithm
INPUT: target face embedding y, black-box model M , loss function L, Nqueries
1: X ← 0
2: Initialize G0
3: for i← 0 to Nqueries do:
4: Allocate image batch X
5: Sample batch G of random gaussians
6: Xj = X + G0 +Gj
7: y′ = M(X)
8: ind = argmin
(
L(y′i, y)
)
9: X ← X +Gind
10: G0 ← 0.99 ·G0
11: i← i + batchsize
12: end for
13: X ← X + G0
OUTPUT: reconstructed face X
4 Experiments
4.1 Baseline reproduce
We use the original NBNet source code (author’s git repository7, accessed March
21, 2020) and trained it on MS1M-ArcFace dataset. Retrain is needed since the
original model is trained with different alignment and worked poorly with photos
aligned for ArcFace (by MTCNN [32]). In the original paper, it was trained on the
DCGAN output, since there were no sufficient datasets at the time of publication.
However, modern datasets are much larger than the number of queries needed for
NBNet (MS1M-ArcFace contains 5.8M images). We followed the original paper
training procedure as far as it was possible. The model was trained with MSE
loss at the first stage, then the perceptual loss was added at the second stage.
The MSE loss stage took 160K×64 queries, then the loss stopped to decrease.
The perceptual loss stage took 100K iterations, as in the original paper.
4.2 Face reconstruction
To evaluate our method we considered two main setups:
1. Reconstruction of faces from a MS-Celeb-1M dataset the attacked network
(ArcFace) is trained on. We used a random subset of 100 faces of different
persons (identities), aligned with MTCNN;
2. Reconstruction of faces that are not presented in the training dataset. We
selected a subset of 100 unique faces of different persons (identities) from
LFW that are not presented in MS1M-ArcFace: we checked each identity in
LFW with all identities given in MS1M-ArcFace and left only ones for which
cosine similariy was below 0.4. All images are aligned with MTCNN too.
7 https://github.com/csgcmai/NBNet
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Fig. 7: Mean cosine similarity between target embedding and embedding of re-
constructed image for filtered LFW subset for our algorithm.
Two sets of images are reconstructed: one with NBNet and another one with the
proposed approach. The obtained faces are then fed to ArcFace and FaceNet to
check the cosine similarity distribution. These setups allow the performance of
given methods to be evaluated in two scenarios:
1. The network has already seen the photo, so it would ease the problem;
2. The network has never seen the photo to be restored.
In order to provide honest comparison, we trained NBNet with the same
hyperparameters on grayscale version of dataset. Since our method restores a
grayscale image, we thought that NBNet could also benefit from the color re-
duction. The results for the first setup are illustrated in Fig. 9. The first figure
Method ArcFace FaceNet # of queries
(Ours) Symmetric gauss, LFW (wb) 0.90 0.45 300k
(Ours) Asymmetric gauss, LFW (wb) 0.85 0.43 400k
NBNet, LFW (RGB) 0.25 0.34 3M
NBNet, LFW (wb) 0.19 0.27 3M
(Ours) Symmetric gauss, MS1M-ArcFace (wb) 0.89 0.42 300k
NBNet, MS1M-ArcFace (RGB) 0.26 0.38 3M
NBNet, MS1M-ArcFace (wb) 0.20 0.32 3M
Table 2: Average cosine similarity by ArcFace and FaceNet (independent critic)
between embedding of a reconstructed image and embedding of target image for
subsets of 100 images from LFW and MS1M-ArcFace and corresponding number
of queries.
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Fig. 8: Examples of recovered images from LFW dataset and the corresponding
cosine similarities by ArcFace and FaceNet.
presents cosine similarity distribution for ArcFace network, where our method
shows the superior performance. However, since ArcFace is the attacked model,
such results might be caused by overfitting. In order to avoid this, we also checked
results with FaceNet. Facenet results also shows superior performance: the dis-
tribution of faces generated by the proposed method is shifted towards a higher
similarity range compared to NBNet. Also it is shown that, in fact, grayscale
train degrades NBNet performance.
We also checked reconstruction for the symmetric and asymmetric modes for
LFW and MS1M-Arcface datasets. Since the symmetric mode reduces the com-
plexity of an optimization process, it should show a superior performance taking
less number of queries compared to the asymmetric mode: which is confirmed
experimentally, and results are shown in Table 2 for both datasets.
The reconstruction process is shown in Fig. 6 with validation on FaceNet.
The obtained faces are given on Fig. 8. We observed interesting behavior in the
reconstruction process: faces with high validation similarity always have high-
quality attributes while low similarity faces have a rather unnatural look (can
be seen on the last column in Fig. 8). This is completely different from what
happens with the face reconstruction by NBNet, where faces are always good to
look at, and the quality does not correlate much with the cosine similarity. We
attribute this problem to the NBNet training procedure, which optimizes MSE
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(a) ArcFace (b) FaceNet
Fig. 9: cosine similarity distribution for reconstructed faces and their true em-
beddings for subset of 100 unique identities from LFW.
loss, which depends on insignificant features such as skin tone, while important
features (eyebrows, nose form and so on) impact slightly.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
We demonstrate that it is possible to recover recognizable faces from deep feature
vectors of a face-recognition model in a black-box mode with no prior knowledge.
The proposed method outperforms current solutions not only in terms of the
average cosine similarity of embeddings produced by the attacked model but in
terms of average cosine similarity given by an independent critic. Moreover, the
proposed method requires a significantly smaller number of queries compared to
previous solutions and does not need prior information such as proper training
dataset, in other words – our algorithm works in a zero-shot mode and hence
does not need to know how faces look like to recover them. As a future work,
we see an investigation of poorly reconstructed faces and further minimization
of the number of queries.
Black-Box Face Recovery from Identity Features 13
References
1. Cao, Q., Shen, L., Xie, W., Parkhi, O.M., Zisserman, A.: Vggface2: A dataset for
recognising faces across pose and age. In: 2018 13th IEEE International Conference
on Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition (FG 2018). pp. 67–74. IEEE (2018)
2. Chen, L.C., Zhu, Y., Papandreou, G., Schroff, F., Adam, H.: Encoder-decoder with
atrous separable convolution for semantic image segmentation. In: Proceedings of
the European conference on computer vision (ECCV). pp. 801–818 (2018)
3. Cole, F., Belanger, D., Krishnan, D., Sarna, A., Mosseri, I., Freeman, W.T.: Syn-
thesizing normalized faces from facial identity features. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 3703–3712 (2017)
4. Deng, J., Guo, J., Xue, N., Zafeiriou, S.: Arcface: Additive angular margin loss
for deep face recognition. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 4690–4699 (2019)
5. Dosovitskiy, A., Brox, T.: Generating images with perceptual similarity metrics
based on deep networks. In: Advances in neural information processing systems.
pp. 658–666 (2016)
6. Dosovitskiy, A., Brox, T.: Inverting visual representations with convolutional net-
works. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition. pp. 4829–4837 (2016)
7. Erhan, D., Bengio, Y., Courville, A., Vincent, P.: Visualizing higher-layer features
of a deep network. University of Montreal 1341(3), 1 (2009)
8. Fredrikson, M., Jha, S., Ristenpart, T.: Model inversion attacks that exploit con-
fidence information and basic countermeasures. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 1322–1333
(2015)
9. Guo, Y., Zhang, L., Hu, Y., He, X., Gao, J.: Ms-celeb-1m: A dataset and benchmark
for large-scale face recognition. In: European conference on computer vision. pp.
87–102. Springer (2016)
10. He, K., Gkioxari, G., Dolla´r, P., Girshick, R.: Mask r-cnn. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE international conference on computer vision. pp. 2961–2969 (2017)
11. He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., Sun, J.: Deep residual learning for image recognition. In:
Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition.
pp. 770–778 (2016)
12. Hitaj, B., Ateniese, G., Perez-Cruz, F.: Deep models under the gan: information
leakage from collaborative deep learning. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 603–618 (2017)
13. Huang, G.B., Mattar, M., Berg, T., Learned-Miller, E.: Labeled faces in the wild:
A database forstudying face recognition in unconstrained environments (2008)
14. Ilyas, A., Engstrom, L., Madry, A.: Prior convictions: Black-box adversarial attacks
with bandits and priors. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.07978 (2018)
15. Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I., Seitz, S.M., Miller, D., Brossard, E.: The megaface
benchmark: 1 million faces for recognition at scale. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
conference on computer vision and pattern recognition. pp. 4873–4882 (2016)
16. Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., Hinton, G.E.: Imagenet classification with deep con-
volutional neural networks. In: Advances in neural information processing systems.
pp. 1097–1105 (2012)
17. Liu, S., Yuen, P.C., Zhang, S., Zhao, G.: 3d mask face anti-spoofing with remote
photoplethysmography. In: European Conference on Computer Vision. pp. 85–100.
Springer (2016)
14 A. Razzhigaev et al.
18. Mahendran, A., Vedaldi, A.: Understanding deep image representations by invert-
ing them. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition. pp. 5188–5196 (2015)
19. Mai, G., Cao, K., Yuen, P.C., Jain, A.K.: On the reconstruction of face images
from deep face templates. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine
intelligence 41(5), 1188–1202 (2018)
20. Mignon, A., Jurie, F.: Reconstructing faces from their signatures using rbf regres-
sion (2013)
21. Mohanty, P., Sarkar, S., Kasturi, R.: From scores to face templates: a model-based
approach. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence 29(12),
2065–2078 (2007)
22. Mordvintsev, A., Olah, C., Tyka, M.: Inceptionism: Going deeper into neural net-
works (2015)
23. Nash, C., Kushman, N., Williams, C.K.: Inverting supervised representations with
autoregressive neural density models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.00400 (2018)
24. Patel, K., Han, H., Jain, A.K.: Secure face unlock: Spoof detection on smartphones.
IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 11(10), 2268–2283 (2016)
25. Redmon, J., Farhadi, A.: Yolov3: An incremental improvement. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.02767 (2018)
26. Ren, S., He, K., Girshick, R., Sun, J.: Faster r-cnn: Towards real-time object detec-
tion with region proposal networks. In: Advances in neural information processing
systems. pp. 91–99 (2015)
27. Schroff, F., Kalenichenko, D., Philbin, J.: Facenet: A unified embedding for face
recognition and clustering. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. pp. 815–823 (2015)
28. Sharif, M., Bhagavatula, S., Bauer, L., Reiter, M.K.: Accessorize to a crime: Real
and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In: Proceedings of the
2016 acm sigsac conference on computer and communications security. pp. 1528–
1540 (2016)
29. Simonyan, K., Vedaldi, A., Zisserman, A.: Deep inside convolutional net-
works: Visualising image classification models and saliency maps. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6034 (2013)
30. Yang, Z., Chang, E.C., Liang, Z.: Adversarial neural network inversion via auxiliary
knowledge alignment. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.08552 (2019)
31. Yosinski, J., Clune, J., Nguyen, A., Fuchs, T., Lipson, H.: Understanding neural
networks through deep visualization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1506.06579 (2015)
32. Zhang, K., Zhang, Z., Li, Z., Qiao, Y.: Joint face detection and alignment using
multitask cascaded convolutional networks. IEEE Signal Processing Letters 23(10),
1499–1503 (2016)
33. Zhang, R., Isola, P., Efros, A.A.: Colorful image colorization. In: ECCV (2016)
34. Zhmoginov, A., Sandler, M.: Inverting face embeddings with convolutional neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04189 (2016)
